Eads Bridge

Webpage developed by David Aynardi

Contents

Introduction Background Design & Construction Modifications Spandrel Bracing Length of Spans Storm Damage Collisions Pneumatic Piling West Abutment Floating Cofferdam Theory Numerical Results References Contact Form
Appendix
1  Woodward Ch XXVI
Other Projects

Background

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In the mid-19th century, the possibility of bridging the Mississippi captured the imagination of St. Louis entrepreneurs. A railroad bridge at St. Louis was a potentially lucrative investment offering profits both directly, from tolls charged to bridge traffic; and indirectly, from the real-estate and industrial development that would follow from improved rail connections through the city. A number of bridge schemes were proposed and rival companies began courting investors and seeking authorization from the state and federal governments, to construct a bridge. Although unbuilt, these early schemes established expectations and constraints that determined the configuration of Eads Bridge.

St. Louis and Illinois Bridge Company of 1855

1st Rock Island Bridge
First Rock Island Bridge, Davenport, Iowa
Image: Putnam Museum of History and Natural Science
The 1855 commencement of work on the Rock Island Bridge, carrying the Chicago and Rock Island Railroad across the Mississippi at Davenport Iowa, generated a sense of urgency. Members of the St. Louis business community were concerned that Chicago was pulling ahead in the race to become the hub of the Midwest's rail network. In this atmosphere, the first St. Louis and Illinois Bridge Company applied for a charter from the Missouri legislature. As a precondition to seeking investors, the company hired J.W. Bissell, the former assistant of famed engineer Charles Ellet Jr., to develop plans for a railway suspension bridge to be located at the foot of Cass Avenue. [1]

The Bissell design was adapted by the company in 1857 but the company's backers considered the estimated cost of $1.5 million too expensive, especially in light of the financial crisis of 1857 and the impending Civil War. The project was shelved and the company never formally incorporated.[2]

Effie Afton

In May 6, 1856, just two weeks after the Rock Island Bridge opened, the St. Louis-based steamboat Effie Afton was swept against it. The shock of the collision overturned a wood-stove on the boat, starting a fire that consumed the boat and part of the bridge. The boat's owners sued the bridge company, claiming that the bridge was an obstruction to navigation. After a lengthy trial in which the young Abraham Lincoln served as a lawyer for the bridge's owners, the case was dismissed. This was a de-facto victory for railroad developers, establishing that at least some degree of obstruction might be acceptable in the interest of improved commerce. Publicity surrounding the trial raised further concern in St. Louis about encroachment by Chicago-based railroad interests. The Rock Island Bridge was quickly repaired and was back in service before the end of the year.[3]

St. Louis and Illinois Bridge Company of 1864

In February of 1864, a group of investors headed by state senator Norman Cutter (James Eads was not among them) obtained a charter from the State of Missouri authorizing a new company, with the same name as the long-dormant St. Louis and Illinois Bridge Company. Application for an Illinois charter was delayed and little progress was made during the rest of 1864.[4]

Homer Report

Britannia_Bridge
Britannia Bridge, Menai Straits, Wales, U.K.
The Britannia Bridge had 460 foot spans.
Print by Robert Kent Thomas, Wikimedia Commons
Also in 1864, a second upriver bridge was completed, at Clinton, Iowa. Concern that St. Louis was slipping further behind Chicago spurred the establishment of a committee of the St. Louis Board of Common Council (the city council) to study bridge-related issues and seek means to expedite construction of a bridge in St. Louis. The council instructed the City Engineer, Truman J. Homer, to make a report discussing the feasibility and probable cost of a bridge. Homer's report, delivered to the Council on February 11, 1865, posited a wrought-iron box-beam similar to Robert Stephenson's "Britannia Bridge" of 1850, supported on four piers with 500 foot spans. The piers were to be supported on large iron cylinders which would be sunk to bedrock using the pneumatic process. The report estimated the cost as $3.3 million, plus an annual "interest and operating cost" of $368,000. Income to the bridge was estimated assuming that the bridge would supplant the ferryboats then in service, and would be able to charge the same tolls as previously charged by the ferry. Per the Homer report, the bridge would be located opposite the approach causeway to "Bloody Island" on the Illinois shore, opposite St. Louis, giving it access to the same rail-lines that served the Wiggens ferry.[5]

St. Louis and Illinois Bridge Company applies for Illinois Charter

In January of 1865, just prior to the city council meeting that commissioned the Homer report, Cutter approached the Illinois legislature seeking a charter for the bridge company to conduct business in Illinois. The charter was granted only after an amendment was inserted, adding a requirement that the bridge must be located within 100 feet of Dyke Avenue in East St. Louis. According to Woodward, in A History of the St. Louis Bridge, the purpose of this amendment was to protect the interests of the Wiggens Ferry Company by placing the bridge opposite St. Louis' business district, where it was assumed that land-acquisition costs would render a bridge infeasible.[6]

Having received authorization from the states, the Cutter organization sought federal authorization to cross a navigable waterway. Missouri senator Benjamin Gratz Brown introduced Senate Bill No 38 on their behalf, in December of 1865.[7]

Other Council Actions

While the Homer Report was being prepared, a committee of the Board of Common Council approached the Missouri Legislature to request amendments to the 1855 charter, which might make it more attractive to investors. A blanket requirement, that the bridge "shall be so constructed so as not to obstruct or impede" navigation, was replaced with more-lenient language requiring that the bridge be "sufficiently high to admit of steamboats...when the chimneys, pipes, and other projections are lowered down".[8] The legislature refused to update the dormant 1855 charter and instead added the requested revisions to the Cutter-group charter of 1864. With the revised Missouri charter in hand, the Council's representatives traveled to Springfield Illinois to request similar revisions to the Cutter-group's Illinois charter. They were unable to accomplish this before end of the legislative session.[9]

Merchant's Exchange Design Criteria

In December 1865 the U.S. Congress and Senate began deliberations on a number of bills authorizing bridges over various western rivers, including Senator Brown's bill regarding a bridge at St. Louis. Brown's bill was referred to the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads, which amended it to add specifications describing an acceptable bridge. The bridge might be a fixed span or pivot or other form of drawbridge. If a fixed span its bottom chord was to be at least 40 feet above the city directrix and the spans must be at least 250 feet long. If a drawbridge, clearance when open must be at least 100 feet on each side of the center pivot.[10]

Telford_600_ft
Thomas Telford's unbuilt design of 1801 for a 600 ft cast iron arch over the Thames in London.
Cited by Eads as precedent for long spans.[16]
Riverboat owners considered these dimensions to be utterly unacceptable and, in April of 1866, convened a committee of the St. Louis Merchant's Exchange (the St. Louis Chamber of Commerce), to develop alternative navigation-friendly design criteria. Eads chaired this committee. The resulting guidelines included a prohibition against draw-bridges and suspension bridges, required a mid-span clearance of at least 50 feet above nominal high-water, and required a minimum of two spans with at least 450 feet or one span with at least 600 feet of clearance between the piers. Senator B. Gratz Brown introduced the Eads committee's guidelines and successfully replaced the offending language in the bill. The final version, signed into law on July 25, 1866, included all of the committee's suggestions with the exception that the required spans were reduced to 350 and 500 feet. Brown later stated that the design restrictions were instrumental to passage of the bridge authorization bill because opponents to authorization, including steamboat interests and railroad companies already invested in bridges on the upper river, assumed that the restrictions would render the St. Louis bridge so expensive that it would never be built.[11]

Illinois and St. Louis Bridge Company

On February 19 1866, shortly before the formation of the Eads Committee, the Cutter group formally incorporated and began seeking investors. Prospective investors required further amendments to the company's charters as a precondition to investing. These included removal of the clause limiting the location of the bridge to within 100 feet of Dyke Avenue, and adding a stipulation that the bridge company would have a 25 year exclusive right to bridge the Mississippi at St. Louis, subject to starting construction within two years.

Chicago-based bridge-builder Lucius B. Boomer approached the Cutter group to secure a contract to construct the bridge. Boomer offered to help shepherd the charter amendments through the Illinois legislature in exchange for being awarded the project. With Boomer's help, the amendments were approved by the Illinois House of Representatives, but when debate moved to the senate, Boomer and his associates had a bill introduced to repeal the St. Louis and Illinois Bridge Company charter and substitute a charter for a new company, the Illinois and St. Louis Bridge Company. The new charter included the revisions sought by the Cutter group for their company – No restriction on location and a 25 year exclusive right. It also authorized the new Illinois company to unite with any company authorized in Missouri. With the Illinois charter in hand, the Boomer group incorporated a Missouri company, the Illinois and St. Louis Bridge Company of Missouri, and filed Articles of Association with the Missouri Secretary of State on February 22, giving it the right to conduct business in both states. Over the course of the following year, the Boomer organization developed a bridge design based on their proprietary "Post truss", with eight spans of varying lengths between 160 and 368 feet, supported on concrete filled cast-iron cylinders. [12]

Eads Takeover of the St. Louis and Illinois Bridge Company

The Boomer group's actions were interpreted by the St. Louis business community as a blatant takeover of the project by Boomer and others favoring the interests of Chicago over those of St. Louis. It was assumed that the Boomer group would sideline the project, delaying construction indefinitely. The St. Louis Merchants Exchange convened an emergency meeting, on February 16, 1867, to discuss the situation. James Eads chaired. A delegation was immediately dispatched to Springfield to lobby on behalf of St. Louis' interests. Their intervention prevented cancellation of the Cutter Group's charter, but they were not able to prevent formation of the new company.[13]

Accepting that the Boomer company's coup could not be undone, Eads and a group of his business associates decided to construct a St. Louis-controlled bridge under the charters already granted to the Cutter Group. On February 17, Eads called a meeting of his allies and of key stockholders in the St. Louis and Illinois Bridge Company to discuss reorganization of the company. During the following weeks, the Eads faction subscribed for $300,000 worth of stock, giving them a majority at shareholder meetings. On May 1, shareholders elected the company's first board of directors. In addition to gaining a position on the company's board, Eads was appointed as chief engineer. Significant among the investors who Eads brought into the company were Thomas A. Scott and J. Edgar Thompson, both officers of the Pennsylvania Railroad (which had operations on both sides of the river that it hoped to assemble into a transcontinental route). The connection with Scott and Thompson contributed to the bridge company's credibility when attempting to sell bonds. It also established a connection with Scott's former employee, Andrew Carnegie, who was vice president and partner in the Keystone Bridge Company, the country's preeminent builder of iron railway bridges.[14]

Consolidation of Bridge Companies

Although successful at establishing its own bridge company, the Boomer organization had difficulty attracting backers. In a bid to discourage investment in its St. Louis rival, the Illinois company threatened to enforce the exclusive right to bridge the river provided by its charter. Fearing a lengthy court fight, investors intervened and pressured the two companies to consolidate. Articles of consolidation were signed on March 5, 1868. The consolidated company would be known as the Illinois and St. Louis Bridge Company and would be governed by a board of directors drawn from the management of both companies. Eads won election as the chief engineer of the new company and had his plans approved. Thereafter, the Eads faction controlled the new company and most of the Boomer holdovers sold their shares.

To preclude further competition, the consolidated Illinois and St. Louis Bridge Company lobbied the US Congress for an act formalizing the company's right to bridge the river. This act was approved on July 20, 1868, but not before amendment on behalf of riverboat interests, to remove the option for multiple spans of 350 feet from the enabling legislation of July 1866. 500 foot spans were now the only option. Elimination of the 350 foot option precluded any return to the Boomer Company's "Post truss" design.[15]


Copyright © 2019-, David Aynardi

Footnotes
  1. Woodward, p.10 ^
  2. Jackson, p.3 ^
  3. Pfeiffer ^
  4. Jackson p.6-7; Woodward p.12 ^
  5. Jackson p. 7, 9-10;Woodward p.10 ^
  6. Woodward p.12 ^
  7. Jackson p.11 ^
  8. Woodward p.12, 13 ^
  1. Jackson p.10 ^
  2. Kouwenhoven p.542 ^
  3. Jackson p.17, 18 ^
  4. Jackson p.19-21 ^
  5. Jackson p.21 ^
  6. Jackson Ch3; Woodward p.15 ^
  7. Jackson p.54,55; Woodward p.29,30 ^
  8. Eads, 1868 Report, p40 ^

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