Eads' title, "Engineer in Chief," is misleading. His role in the design was closer to that of an architect. He established the general configuration of his bridge, largely in response to aesthetic criteria, then relied on his professional staff to figure out how to make it work. This collaboration produced an unusually graceful and expressive structure, an example of what David Billington, in his book The Tower and the Bridge,[1] terms “Structural Art."
Eads' design achieved a high degree of aesthetic refinement but cost more and took longer to build than a more pragmatic design might have. This was not an unanticipated outcome. Lowest first cost was simply not at the top of Eads' list of priorities. Carl Gayler, who had worked as a draughtsman in Eads' office, captured this dynamic in his 1909 address to the Engineer's Club of St Louis.
The Eads Bridge is called..."a model of aesthetic design." An unprecedented amount of labor and time, in the St. Louis office, was spent in merely "proportioning" it. The structure would have been just as serviceable if the three arches had been of equal length, if the center arch and the adjoining ends of the side arches had been on a level with the bearings at the abutments, if the grades of the railroad and roadway floors had not been built to the exact lines of parabolas...
...But is not, in permanent structures built in our large cities, beauty of design justified even at somewhat increased cost?
And here I beg leave to put on record the fact that this proportioning, this designing of our bridge, was the exclusive work of Jas. B. Eads. The credit for this was never before given to him, but it is due to him as surely as the exclusive credit for the computations is due to Mr. Charles Pfeifer, and the exclusive credit for the bold manner of erection to Col.Henry Flad.[3]
The fundamental decision to use arches was not arrived at by engineering analysis. Instead, it appears to have been based on received ideas about structural efficiency and on Ead's conviction that arches would look better than a truss. Eads’ preference for arches was apparent, even before he took on the task of designing a bridge, in his choice of Telford’s Thames River arch as precedent for long spans and in the arch-friendly language that he inserted into the model legislation prepared by his committee of the St Louis Merchant’s Exchange (Chamber of Commerce).
The committee finished its work in April of 1866. By March of the following year, even before he had assembled his engineering staff, Eads was already promoting a bridge with 500 foot steel arches and agitating for the formation of the St Louis Bridge Company.[4] In April he hired Henry Flad, followed soon by Charles Pfeifer, to develop the three-arch concept into the design presented in the 1868 Report of the Engineer in Chief.[5] From the start, Pfeifer's and Flad's assignment was to design an arch bridge, there is no record that other structural systems were considered.
Eads understood that investors might not be comfortable with his perfunctory decision to use arches. He addresses the choice in the 1868 report; first in the chapter titled “Arch and Truss Bridges” and again in the “Convention of Engineers” section. At first glance these chapters leave the impression that the choice of arches was inevitable. A closer reading reveals that while the articles hint that an arch might be more economical than a truss bridge, they stop short of explicitly stating that this will be the case.
The Board had nothing to say about arches but it did advise against the 500 foot option allowed by the enabling legislation. Instead, it recommended a truss bridge with eight spans, the longest being 368 feet.
In his rebuttal, Eads agrees that a 500 foot truss would be prohibitively expensive but he asserts that the Board might have reached a different conclusion if they had considered an arch bridge. He “proves" this by extrapolating the cost of a 520 foot truss from data for the Board’s proposed 368 foot span and comparing this with an arch estimated using the same unit prices. Eads finds that the truss would be significantly more expensive, but this is superstructure cost only. He admits that he does not have cost data for the 520 foot truss’ piers and foundations.[7] Without this information, the comparison cannot be completed.
Eads concludes the article by citing the published cost of the substructures of his proposed three arch bridge and of the Board of Engineer’s eight span truss bridge. The Board’s number is higher. This comparison serves to muddy the water but it is inconclusive because it ignores the radically different number and size of the spans and piers in the two designs.
The Report achieved its goal of reassuring investors. In the months following its publication, the company sold three million dollars worth of stock subscriptions, forty percent of which were paid in full. With this money in hand the board of directors authorized the start of construction for the river piers and east abutment.[8]
After publication of the 1868 Report Eads revised the design to eliminate the suspended railroad deck. This adjustment improved the appearance of the bridge but further reduced the rise of the arches, from ten to nine percent of span.[15] [16]
With less than half the rise of an optimal arch, Eads’ arches generate approximately twice the thrust. This is reflected in the size and cost of the arch chords and the masonry supports. More-efficient arches would have been possible if they were allowed to extend above the highway as was done at the Koblenz bridge, but this would have compromised Eads’ preferred profile.
After deciding to use fixed-end arches further adjustments were made to optimize their performance. The depth of the arches was changed from eight to twelve feet between the chords. According to Eads, twelve feet achieved the best trade-off between deflection control and thermal stress.
At first glance the decision to use fixed ends appears to be at odds with Waddell’s conclusion that hinged arches are usually lighter. The discrepancy can be attributed to the tendency of flat arches to deflect more then the taller arches favored by Waddell and therefore to benefit more from the stiffening effect of fixed ends. There is no reason to assume that Pfeifer got his sums wrong.
In the 1868 Report Eads asserts that, in order to resist the floods and ice-flows of the Mississippi, any type of bridge at St Louis, not just arch bridges, will require unusually massive piers and abutments. This requirement for oversized piers negates the advantage of a truss.[21]
Eads makes the further, somewhat contradictory, argument that because of their small size the piers of a truss bridge require more-expensive construction then is needed for the supports of an arch bridge. While the slender piers of a truss bridge must be meticulously-crafted ashlar all the way through, the generous dimensions of Eads’ piers and abutments enables them to be constructed as a shell of dressed stone enclosing a rubble core. Because the rubble masonry might cost 30 percent less per ton, the bulky substructures of Eads Bridge exact less of a cost penalty than their size might suggest.[22]
In the event, the need to oversize the piers of truss bridges was not as dramatic as Eads predicted. The next two spans constructed at St Louis after Eads Bridge, the Merchant’s and MacArthur (formerly Municipal) bridges, were both trusses. These bridges have similar spans and were designed for heavier live loads than Eads Bridge. Their masonry piers are exposed to the same environmental threats that Eads ascribed to the river at St Louis and yet their designers were able to make them much smaller than the piers at Eads Bridge.[23] [24] Even if Eads was correct about the low unit cost of his masonry, his piers and abutments contain 30 percent more material than the piers of the newer bridges.[25] The basic structure of his piers would be at least as expensive and they would incur greater caisson and excavation costs in proportion to their greater size.
John Kowenhoven quotes Carl Gayler about the design of the arch chords. According to Gayler, Charles Pfeifer "...made a sketch of what he considered a proper cross-section for the chords of the arches, all in the European style: plates and angles riveted together."
Eads promptly vetoed it. “Tubes, safely enveloped, had been one of his earliest conceptions... Eads just loved this part of the work and all the minutest details of the tubes with their couplings and pin connections, the skewbacks and anchor bolts, all of it to the last 1/8 of an inch are the work of Eads, of course always subject to Pfeifer's established effective areas."[26]
Eads domesticated Pfeifer’s characteristically European design by interpreting it as a pin-connected assemblage of tubular struts and eye-bars, not unlike the patent trusses usually provided by American builders. In theory, the circular cross section of his chords provides the best resistance to buckling. It also creates a dramatic distinction between the primary members of the arches and other components, a contrast which may have appealed to Eads’ aesthetic sensibility.
Although attractive, Eads’ design required complicated shaping and joinery, compounding the difficulty of working with the unfamiliar material, steel. The curved staves for the chords proved difficult to roll and the forgings for the couplings were nearly impossible to make.[27] [28] Months were lost before the metallurgic problems were resolved and then, when usable blanks began to arrive at Keystone’s shop for finishing, progress was further impeded by the extensive machining and close tolerances required for the couplings. It took two and one-half work-days to turn and groove the ends of a single tube, a similar amount of time to plane the mating surfaces, bore out the interior, and cut matching grooves in each coupling, and yet more time to complete the pins and prepare the holes to receive them. With 1,036 tubes and 1,012 couplings to produce, the bridge company was forced to pay for night work and to finance the acquisition of additional machine tools for Keystone. Even with these added resources, a steady flow of finished tubes and couplings did not begin to arrive at the bridge until June of 1873, two years after Butcher’s first attempts at forging and a year after the first blanks were delivered to Keystone.[29]
Charles Pfeifer’s riveted box-sections might have required slightly more metal and might have been less dramatic than Eads' tubes and eye-bars, but they would have eliminated the curved staves, the forgings, and most of the machine-shop work.
When all of the many difficulties that have retarded this great work shall have at last been surmounted, and the Bridge becomes an accomplished fact, it will be found unequaled in the important qualities of strength, durability, capacity and magnitude, by any similar structure in the world. Its great usefulness, undoubted safety and beautiful proportions will constitute it a national pride, entitling those through whose individual wealth it has been created to the respect of their fellow men; while its imperishable construction will convey to future ages a noble record of the enterprise and intelligence which mark the present times.[30]
Eads neglected to include this manifesto in the 1868 Report of the Engineer in Chief. Instead it was published in the 1871 report, applying a positive spin to that report's account of the growing cost and delayed completion of the bridge.